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What is the autonomy of EU law, and why does that matter? 
Niamh Nic Shuibhne * 
 
Abstract  
This article argues that the autonomy of EU law and of the EU legal order collects together a set of 
rules and principles but also constitutes a principle of EU law on its own terms. Autonomy as a principle 
of EU law has acquired specific characteristics that suggest a distinctive existential character, in light 
of its internal and external reach but, more particularly, a quality of extremity that has come to define 
its implications. Reflecting on the nature of autonomy matters because of the closing down of space 
for compromise that it produces and for what is uncovered about the nature of EU primary law in 
consequence. The development and effects of autonomy have manifested mainly in connection with 
the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, but the wider focus on autonomy of ‘Union decision-making’ 
as a ‘core principle’ of ongoing Brexit negotiations, for the EU part, may activate a more generalised 
understanding of what the principle commands. That process will also test, then, the extent to which 
an extreme understanding of autonomy as an existential principle should be sustained.  
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In Van Gend en Loos, the Commission argued that ‘judged by the international law of contract and by 
the general legal practice between States, the European Treaties represent a far-reaching legal 
innovation and that it would be wrong to consider them in the light only of the general principles of 
the law of nations’.1 Here are seeds of the enduring sense that the EU legal order is distinctive. The 
autonomy of EU law expresses elements of that distinctiveness in concrete, legally meaningful ways. 
In essence, it serves to establish boundaries around the extent to which the EU legal order can interact 
with both national legal orders and the international legal order, reflecting a basic understanding of 
autonomy as ‘self-rule’ in many respects. But the underlying starting point of establishing and 
protecting the EU legal order as something distinctive has also produced a very particular, very 
powerful and often controversial conception of autonomy. It is, after all, the principle that has 
defeated commitments made by the EU and/or the EU Member States in the spheres of external 
cooperation,2 investment,3 financial sanctions4 and intellectual property,5 and it has stalled the 
(Treaty-mandated) accession of the EU to the ECHR.6  
                                                     
* School of Law, University of Edinburgh. This work was funded by a Leverhulme Trust Major Research 
Fellowship. Sincere thanks to the participants at the workshop in February 2018 for very helpful questions, and 
to Marise Cremona and Christophe Hillion for invaluable comments on an earlier draft of the written paper.  
1 AG Roemer in Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos, EU:C:1962:42 ([1963] ECR 1, p20, emphasis in original). 
2 E.g. Opinion 1/91 (EEA Agreement I), EU:C:1991:490. 
3 E.g. Case C-284/16 Achmea, EU:C:2018:158 
4 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Bakaraat International Foundation, EU:C:2008:46. 
5 Opinion 1/09 (Draft agreement on the European and Community Patents Court), EU:C:2011:123. 
6 Opinion 2/13 (Draft agreement on accession to the ECHR), EU:C:2014:2454.  
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 This article reflects on two core questions overall: what is the autonomy of EU law, and why 
should we be asking that question in the first place? To contribute to understanding about the nature 
and implications of autonomy, the discussion is structured around three main claims: first, that 
autonomy of EU law not only collects together a set of rules and principles but also constitutes a 
principle of EU law on its own terms; second, that autonomy as a principle of EU law has been shaped 
around specific characteristics that generate an acutely ‘existential’ character; and, third, that the 
ongoing Brexit process has activated a more generalised understanding and application of autonomy 
beyond the Court-rooted context in which its force has been felt most intensively to date. 
Fundamentally, questions about the anatomy of autonomy as a principle matter because of what they 
reveal about the underexamined nature and workings of EU primary law. 
 In Section 2, the qualities of autonomy are outlined at a general level, tracing the making of 
the principle and the articulation of its main characteristics through the case law of the Court of 
Justice. This discussion focuses on the autonomy of EU law and/or of the EU legal system and/or of 
the EU legal order, all of which are terms used by the Court but usually in proximity to each other. 
What autonomy produces beyond the sum of these parts is then examined in Section 3. Here, it is 
argued that autonomy of EU law represents something that has become ‘fundamental to the existence 
of the [Union]’7 – that it has become an ‘existential’ principle of Union law. This characterization is 
drawn from both its scope (i.e. it has internal and external effects) and, in particular, the extremity of 
its impact when invoked. It is argued that such an extreme conception of autonomy is more a 
contrived than inherent outcome, connecting to questions about whether the autonomy of EU law is 
more about securing the authority of the Court of Justice than sustaining the self-rule capacity of the 
EU as a system. In this sense, however, autonomy is not just about who may exercise the power to 
determine interaction with other systems; but about the extent to which the application of autonomy 
to an existential degree has closed off the potential for such interaction. 
In Section 4, the function of the autonomy of Union decision-making as part of the Brexit 
negotiation process is examined to demonstrate that the principle of autonomy has more 
generalizable reach than its predominantly Court-focused history to date. In many respects, autonomy 
seems still to reflect in this broader context the extreme qualities of existential principle. Adapting the 
Brexit-familiar idea of ‘red lines’ to explain this, autonomy sets down not political choices but legal 
boundaries beyond which no EU actor can legitimately pass. The degree to which Brexit compromises 
may yet be made (or not made) on the EU side will necessarily reveal more about autonomy and, more 
particularly, about whether or where some limits to the extremity of its impact might be conceived. 
                                                     
7 Case 149/79 Commission v Belgium, EU:C:1980:297, para. 19 (emphasis added); here, in the context of 
precluding ‘recourse to the provisions of the domestic legal systems’ to preclude impairment of the ‘unity and 
efficacy’ of Union law; the unity of Union law returned to in section 3.2 below. 
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2. The Qualities of Autonomy 
It is, and has always been, a fundamental concern of the Court of Justice that EU law ‘must be 
effectively and uniformly applied throughout the whole of the [Union]’.8 A series of ‘specific’9 
characteristics of EU law then follow, ‘relating to the constitutional structure of the EU, which is seen 
in the principle of conferral of powers referred to in Articles 4(1) TEU and 5(1) and (2) TEU, and in the 
institutional framework established in Articles 13 TEU to 19 TEU’.10 Additionally, ‘[t]o these must be 
added the specific characteristics arising from the very nature of EU law’11 – notably the 
supranationally derived principles of interpretation that determine the relationship between national 
and EU law (primacy and direct effect).12 These ‘essential  characteristics of the EU and its law’13 
generate implications for the EU legal system: the Court continues to affirm that the EU has a ‘new 
kind of legal order, the nature of which is peculiar to the EU, its own constitutional framework and 
founding principles, a particularly sophisticated institutional structure and a full set of legal rules to 
ensure its operation’.14  
Especially for present purposes, the Court has stressed the independence of this system – its 
autonomy – relative to the legal systems of the Member States15 and to the international legal order.16 
In fact, ‘the autonomy of EU law with respect both to the law of the Member States and to 
                                                     
8 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos, EU:C:1963:1 ([1963] ECR 1, p7, emphasis added), noting the submission of the 
Commission. 
9 Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para. 161, referring to Protocol (No 8) relating to article 6(2) of the Treaty on 
European Union on the accession of the Union to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. While the ‘specific characteristics’ of Union law are referred to in Article 1 of the 
Protocol and in a Declaration (on Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union), Article 2 covers the autonomy 
of EU law – in the sense of the ‘essential characteristics of the EU and its law’ presented below – through its 
stipulation that ‘accession of the Union shall not affect the competences of the Union or the powers of its 
institutions’. For a different view, see C Contartese, ‘The Autonomy of the EU Legal Order in the ECJ’s External 
Relations Case Law: From the “Essential” to the “Specific Characteristics” of the Union and Back Again’, 54:6 
Common Market Law Review (2017) p.1628. 
10 Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para. 162.  
11 Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para. 166. 
12 Van Gend en Loos, supra note 8; Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL, EU:C:1964:66. 
13 Achmea, supra note 3, para. 33. 
14 Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para. 158. See generally, S Weatherill, ‘From Myth to Reality: The EU’s “New 
Legal Order” and the Place of General Principles Within It’ in S Vogenauer and S Weatherill (eds.), General 
Principles of Law: European and Comparative Perspectives (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2017) pp.21-38. More 
recently, the Commission conveys this distinctiveness by describing the EU as a ‘unique ecosystem 
underpinned by instruments and structures that cannot be separated from each other’ (European 
Commission, Task Force for the Preparation and Conduct of the Negotiations with the United Kingdom under 
Article 50 TEU, Internal EU27 preparatory discussions on the framework for the future relationship: 
“Regulatory Issues”, 21 February 2018, <ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/slides_regulatory_issues.pdf>, visited on 24 May 2018).  
15 E.g. Van Gend en Loos, supra note 8, p12; Costa v ENEL, supra note 12. 
16 E.g. Kadi, supra note 4; see further, AG Poiares Maduro (EU:C:2008:11), para. 21 of the Opinion. 
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international law is justified by the essential characteristics’.17 At the same time, however, the Court 
constitutes a paradoxical interdependency of the ‘legal relations’ between the EU and its Member 
States that also characterizes the system, since ‘[t]hese essential characteristics of EU law have given 
rise to a structured network of principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal relations linking 
the EU and its Member States, and its Member States with each other, which are now engaged, as is 
recalled in the second paragraph of Article 1 TEU, in a “process of creating an ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe”’.18 It is not just, then, a merging of sovereignties;19 but a concession of national 
autonomy that feeds into the construction and operation of EU autonomy. In Costa v ENEL, AG 
Lagrange had already expressed this idea, referring to a ‘legal system separate from that of the 
Member States, but nevertheless intimately and even organically tied to it in such a way that the 
mutual and constant respect for the respective jurisdictions of the [Union] and national bodies is one 
of the fundamental conditions of a proper functioning of the system instituted by the Treaty and, 
consequently, of the realization of the aims of the [Union]’.20 To summarize how autonomy was then 
developed in the case law of the Court, the following discussion is structured around three of its 
dimensions: purposive, substantive, and institutional.  
The purposive dimension of autonomy is essentially that this ‘particular legal order’ enables 
pursuit of the particular aims and objectives of the Union.21 This is the context in which the internal 
workings of the EU legal order are shielded from external intrusions on their functioning,22 where 
‘external’ intrusions also means insulation from national legal orders.23 Here, then, we start to see a 
legal order ‘separate from’ manifesting not just a basic concern for self-rule, but also an impulse 
towards self-reference. Its specialness is generated, for the Court, through the ‘fundamental premiss 
that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that they share with 
it, a set of common values on which the EU is founded, as stated in Article 2 TEU. That premiss implies 
and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be 
                                                     
17 Achmea, supra note 3, para. 33. 
18 Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para. 167. Similarly, ‘[t]he EU legal order is interdependent and interwoven with 
the national legal orders both, functionally and in substance. The autonomous legal orders do not exist 
separately from each other’ (I Pernice, ‘The Autonomy of the EU Legal Order – Fifty Years after Van Gend’ in A 
Tizzano, J Kokott and S Prechal (Eds.), 50th anniversary of the judgment in Van Gend en Loos, 1963–2013, 
conference proceedings, Luxembourg, 13 May 2013 (Office des publications de l’Union européenne, 2013), 
p.62. 
19 AG Roemer in Van Gen den Loos, supra note 1, p12. 
20 AG Lagrange in Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL (EU:C:1964:51, [1964] ECR 585, pp605-606, emphasis added). 
21 Opinion 1/91, supra note 2, para. 50 (emphasis added); see further, Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para. 172, 
referring to ‘the implementation of the process of integration that is the raison d’être of the EU itself’. 
22 E.g. Opinion 1/00 (Proposed agreement between the European Community and non-Member States on the 
establishment of a European Common Aviation Area), EU:C:2002:231, para. 13. 
23 E.g. Case 283/81 CILFIT, EU:C:1982:335, esp. para. 19: ‘[Union] law uses terminology which is peculiar to it. 
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that legal concepts do not necessarily have the same meaning in [Union] 
law and in the law of the various Member States’. 
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recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected’.24 The 
bonded nature of the relationship between the EU and its Member States is fortified by the principle 
of sincere cooperation.25 Reflecting the fundamental nature of trust and cooperation, what we might 
term the standard of breach of autonomy then tends to be expressed in simultaneously severe and 
mild terms: contrasting the language of what is breached, on the one hand – ‘undermined’, essential’, 
‘preservation’ ‘very foundations of the Union’, ‘threat posed’, etc – with even a likelihood that 
autonomy might be ‘adversely affected’, on the other.26 This point is returned to in Section 3.2 below. 
At face value, the substantive dimension of the autonomy of EU law is not strongly developed 
beyond the protection of fundamental rights. In that respect, the Court has ruled that ‘the review by 
the Court of the validity of any [Union] measure in the light of fundamental rights must be considered 
to be the expression, in a community based on the rule of law, of a constitutional guarantee stemming 
from the [TFEU] as an autonomous legal system which is not to be prejudiced by an international 
agreement’.27 Reflecting the understanding already expressed in the explanations,28 the Court has 
identified the purpose of Article 52(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as seeking ‘to ensure the 
necessary consistency between the rights contained in it and the corresponding rights guaranteed by 
the ECHR, without thereby adversely affecting the autonomy of EU law and that of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union’.29  
However, the self-referential quality of autonomy also comes through in the substantive 
dimension. For example, the Court asserts in Opinion 2/13 that ‘[t]he autonomy enjoyed by EU law in 
relation to the laws of the Member States and in relation to international law requires that the 
interpretation of those fundamental rights be ensured within the framework of the structure and 
objectives of the EU’.30 The standards that really matter, then, are the standards set by the EU. The 
priority accorded to the EU system-specific interpretations of EU measures that filters into the EEA 
                                                     
24 Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para. 168; on mutual trust in the context of ASFJ, see paras 191-194. 
25 Achmea, supra note 3, para. 58. 
26 E.g. Opinion 1/91, supra note 2, paras 29, 35 and 47; Opinion 1/00, supra note 22, paras 5 and 12; Achmea, 
supra note 3, para. 59.  
27 Kadi, supra note 4, para. 316; see also, paras 281-284, and Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, paras 168-170.  
28 2007 OJ C303/17. See further, AG Trstenjak in Case C-411/10 NS (EU:C:2011:611), para. 146 of the Opinion: 
‘the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights essentially always constitute case-specific judicial 
decisions and not the rules of the ECHR themselves, and it would therefore be wrong to regard the case-law of 
the European Court of Human Rights as a source of interpretation with full validity in connection with the 
application of the Charter. This finding, admittedly, may not hide the fact that particular significance and high 
importance are to be attached to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in connection with the 
interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, with the result that it must be taken into consideration in 
interpreting the Charter’. 
29 Case C-18/16 K, EU:C:2017:680, para. 50. Article 52(3) of the Charter provides that ‘[i]n so far as this Charter 
contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by 
the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection’. 
30 Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para. 170. 
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system is an example.31 Seen in this way, the substantive dimension of autonomy ensures an EU-
dominant outcome in multiple instances of ‘interaction’ between EU and other standards. 
From the institutional perspective, the Court emphasizes ‘the allocation of responsibilities 
defined in the Treaties and, hence, the autonomy of the [Union] legal order’ but adds that ‘respect for 
which must be assured by the Court of Justice’.32 At a general level, the Court aims to protect the 
‘distribution of powers between the [Union] and the Member States’.33 In Opinion 1/76, realizing the 
functional separation of the EU institutions from the Member States in the governance of an 
international agreement was paramount, achieved with a now familiar critique of ‘both a surrender 
of the independence of action of the Community in its external relations [‘un abandon de l'autonomie 
d'action de la Communauté’ in the French text] and a change in the internal constitution of the 
Community by the alteration of essential elements of the Community structure as regards both the 
prerogatives of the institutions and the position of the Member States vis-à-vis one another’.34 
Conversely, ‘where an agreement more clearly separates the [Union] from the other Contracting 
Parties from an institutional point of view and no longer affects either the exercise by the [Union] and 
its institutions of their powers by changing the nature of those powers, or the interpretation of [Union] 
law, the autonomy of the [Union] legal order can be considered to be secure’.35  
But the historically general expression of institutional autonomy is without question most 
strongly developed with respect to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to interpret EU law and 
thereby ensure the ‘observance’ of the ‘autonomy of the [Union] legal system’,36 underpinned by 
references to Articles 19(1) TEU37 and 344 TFEU.38 That jurisdiction itself ‘form[s] part of the very 
foundations of the [Union]’.39 Precisely ‘to ensure that the specific characteristics and the autonomy 
of that legal order are preserved, the Treaties have established a judicial system intended to ensure 
consistency and uniformity in the interpretation of EU law’.40 
                                                     
31 Opinion 1/91, supra note 2; Opinion 1/92 (EEA Agreement II), EU:C:1992:189. 
32 Opinion 1/91, supra note 2, para. 35 (emphasis added). See also, Kadi, supra note XX, para. 282. 
33 Opinion 1/00, supra note 22, para. 5 (citing Opinion 1/91, supra note 2); see also, paras 30-46. 
34 Opinion 1/76, EU:C:1977:63, para. 12.  
35 Opinion 1/00, supra note 22, para. 6, citing Opinion 1/92 as an example. 
36 Kadi, supra note 4, para. 282. 
37 E.g. on the Court of Justice, Opinion 1/91, supra note 2, para. 35; on the role of national courts and 
tribunals, Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para. 163. Article 19(1) TEU provides that the Court of Justice of the 
European Union ‘shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed. 
Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by 
Union law’. 
38 E.g. Opinion 1/91, supra note 2, para. 35; Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para. 201. Article 344 TFEU provides 
that Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein’. 
39 Kadi, supra note 4, para. 282. 
40 Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para. 174; see also, Achmea, supra note 3, para. 35. 
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On paper, this is not an absolute barrier to interaction with other systems or with other 
mechanisms for the settlement of disputes. In other words, where an international agreement 
‘provid[es] for the creation of a court responsible for the interpretation of its provisions…such an 
agreement is not, in principle, incompatible with European Union law’ since the ‘competence of the 
European Union in the field of international relations and its capacity to conclude international 
agreements necessarily entail the power to submit itself to the decisions of a court which is created 
or designated by such agreements as regards the interpretation and application of their provisions’.41 
However, such an agreement may ‘not change the essential character of the function of the Court as 
conceived in the EU and FEU Treaties’; this requires that ‘the indispensable conditions for safeguarding 
the essential character of those powers are satisfied and, consequently, there is no adverse effect on 
the autonomy of the European Union legal order’.42  
In practical terms, this has come to mean that ‘any action by the bodies given decision-making 
powers…as provided for in the agreement envisaged, must not have the effect of binding the EU and 
its institutions, in the exercise of their internal powers, to a particular interpretation of the rules of EU 
law’.43 Where the Court of Justice is (required to be) involved, its determinations must be binding and 
not merely advisory.44 Furthermore, Member States may not establish ‘a mechanism for settling 
disputes…which would prevent those disputes from being resolved in a manner that ensures the full 
effectiveness of EU law, even though they might concern the interpretation or application of that law’ 
or conclude a treaty by which they ‘agree to remove from the jurisdiction of their own courts, and 
hence from the system of judicial remedies which the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU 
requires them to establish in the fields covered by EU law…disputes which may concern the 
application or interpretation of EU law’.45 Particular importance is conferred on the functioning and 
significance of the preliminary ruling procedure i.e. ‘the task assigned to the Court of Justice under 
Article [267 TFEU], the object of which is to secure uniform interpretation of the Treaty by national 
                                                     
41 Opinion 1/09, supra note 5, para. 74 (emphasis added); see also e.g. Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para. 182. 
42 Opinion 1/09, supra note 5, paras 75-76; see also e.g. Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para. 183. See generally, 
‘Editorial Comments: The EU's Accession to the ECHR - A “NO” from the ECJ!’, 52:1 Common Market Law 
Review (2015) pp.1-16. 
43 Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para. 184. Specifically on the question of EU accession to the ECHR, the Court 
confirmed that ‘it should not be possible for the ECtHR to call into question the Court’s findings in relation to 
the scope ratione materiae of EU law, for the purposes, in particular, of determining whether a Member State 
is bound by fundamental rights of the EU’ (para. 186). 
44 Opinion 1/92, supra note 31, esp. para. 33. 
45 Achmea, supra note 3, paras 56 and 55 respectively. See also, Opinion 1/00, supra note 22, para. 17: 
‘disputes between the Member States, or between those States and the [Union] institutions, concerning 
interpretation of the rules of [Union] law…will continue to be dealt with exclusively by the machinery provided 
for by the Treaty’. Consider also the Court’s refusal to recognise the direct effect of international norms e.g. 
Case C-308/06 Intertanko, EU:C:2008:312 
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courts and tribunals’.46 Relatedly, the responsibilities but also the privileges of national courts and 
tribunals, to ensure their functioning as EU courts within that system, must be protected.47  
Overall, the trajectory of the autonomy of the EU legal order as one ‘separate from’ others 
can be seen to have moved quickly from concerns for independence or self-rule to the entrenchment 
of self-reference; the question then becoming, who, institutionally, has the power to determine the 
Union’s capacity for interaction with other systems and their standards. This leads not only, then, to 
the idea of the Union standing apart, but to the question of just how far apart it stands – and why. 
 
3. The Nature of Autonomy: What Kind of Principle? 
Merging together the purposive, substantive and institutional dimensions summarized above, what 
‘is’ the resulting autonomy of EU law? In Section 3.1, the nature of autonomy as a principle of EU law, 
and more specifically as a ‘structural’ principle of EU law,48 is outlined. In Section 3.2, the argument 
that autonomy is, additionally, an ‘existential’ principle of the Union is advanced. 
 
3.1 A Principle of Union Law 
As Section 2 demonstrates, the autonomy of EU law and/or of the EU legal order was constructed by 
knitting together a ‘body of principles’49 drawn from ‘the specific characteristics arising from the very 
nature of EU law’.50 However, it is also a general principle of EU law on its own terms, in the sense 
that, as the case law presented in Section 2 establishes, it meets the definition of ‘fundamental 
propositions of law which underlie a legal system and from which concrete rules or outcomes may be 
derived’.51 In that light, its constituent parts may not, individually, have defeated the particular 
method of EU accession to the ECHR assessed in Opinion 2/13; but the deployment of autonomy as a 
principle had precisely that effect. Conceiving of autonomy as a principle and not just as a way to 
describe a bundle of other legal norms does therefore have added (legal) value: there is a discernible 
sum that is greater than the individual parts.  
                                                     
46 Van Gend en Loos, supra note 8, p12. See also, Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para. 176, describing the 
preliminary ruling procedure as the ‘keystone’ of the EU judicial system (see further, paras 198-199); see 
similarly, Achmea, supra note 3, para. 37. 
47 Opinion 1/09, supra note 5, para. 85; Case C-42/17 MAS, EU:C:2017:936, para. 22. See also, Case C-64/16 
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, EU:C:2018:117, paras 32-34. 
48 M Cremona (ed.), Structural Principles in EU External Relations Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2018). 
49 M Dougan, ‘An Airbag for the Crash Test Dummies? EU-UK Negotiations for a Post-Withdrawal “Status Quo” 
Transitional Regime under Article 50 TEU’, 55:2/3 Common Market Law Review (2018) p.87. 
50 Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para. 166. 
51 T Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law 2nd ed. (OUP, Oxford, 2006) p.1. 
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 More particularly, Cremona’s characterization of autonomy as a ‘structural’ principle of EU 
law compellingly illuminates the work that it performs within, and for, the EU legal order.52 Cremona 
first acknowledges the argument that trying to classify principles of Union law collapses into futility, 
that the ‘value of a classification of general principles is limited’.53 However, she then defends the 
‘increase [in] our understanding’ that classification brings: it sheds light on ‘the contribution to policy-
making of each different actor (Member States as well as the institutions) and the balance and 
constructive relationships between them; their accountability to individuals and third countries 
affected by their decisions and the transparency that underpins that accountability’; of particular 
importance in EU external relations since ‘the substantive content of that policy is left so undefined 
by EU Treaty law’.54 This defence is strongly supported here since, as manifestations of EU primary 
law,55 principles act as both ‘positive’ shapers of and ‘negative’ constraints on action undertaken by 
the EU institutions and by the Member States.  
The autonomy of EU law is a particularly potent device of EU primary law and its unfolding 
character and implications ‘entail important implications for a better understanding of the EU Treaties 
as the Union constitution’.56 Moreover, while many general principles of EU law now also find 
expression in the EU Treaties, autonomy does not. The objective here is not so much to connect to 
debates about whether a hierarchy of primary law sources exists in the EU system,57 but instead to 
argue that extra-Treaty primary law deserves especially close scrutiny. It is at the edges of EU law yet 
provides a frame around the whole enterprise. It can have extraordinary implications for choices made 
politically yet develops amorphously. Hillion’s conception of an emerging ‘Union membership law’, 
including the ‘quasi-primary law-making power’ being exercised by the European Council in the Brexit 
negotiations, provides a perfect example of how a distinctive swathe of primary law can – still – evolve 
with simultaneously acute legal effects yet a vagueness around its grounding authority and detailed 
content.58 Several analyses of Opinion 2/13 questioned the Court’s privileging of the ‘essential 
characteristics’ of EU law, which are not expressed in the Treaties, over the protection of fundamental 
rights, expressed with some rhetorical vigor in several Treaty provisions.59 In short: what is EU primary 
law, and who gets to say what it is? 
                                                     
52 M Cremona, ‘Structural Principles and their Role in EU External Relations Law’ in M Cremona (ed.), supra 
note 48, pp.3-29.  
53 Ibid p.15. 
54 Ibid.  
55 E.g. Kadi, supra note 4, para. 308; Joined Cases C‑ 402/07 and C‑ 432/07 Sturgeon, EU:C:2009:716, para. 48. 
56 Contartese, supra note 9, p.1637. 
57 Debates outlined by Contartese, ibid. 
58 C Hillion, ‘Withdrawal under Article 50 TEU: An Integration-Friendly Process’, 55:2/3 Common Market Law 
Review (2018), p.52. 
59 E.g. S Peers, ‘The EU’s Accession to the ECHR: The Dream Becomes a Nightmare’, 16:1 German Law Journal 
(2015) p.221; Eeckhout, ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue – Autonomy or 
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In the specific context of EU external relations, Cremona distinguishes ‘structural’ principles 
as those ‘drawn from the Treaties and elaborated by the Court’ to establish and protect ‘an 
institutional space within which policy may be formed, in which the different actors understand and 
work within their respective roles’.60 They are structural ‘in the sense of defining and being inherent 
to the deep structure of the EU’;61 and they include sincere cooperation, conferral, institutional 
balance, solidarity, subsidiarity, and autonomy. Cremona argues that structural principles are ‘not 
concerned with the substantive content of policy, but rather with process and the relationships 
between the actors in those processes, and their normative content reflects this’.62 As observed in 
Section 2, the priority sought for EU fundamental rights standards – over and above the content of 
fundamental rights protection that might be distilled from external sources – in Kadi and Opinion 2/13 
reflects precisely this idea. Azoulai adds an important safeguarding function of structural principles 
for the specific context of the Union: ‘[s]tructural principles are seen as forms of rationalisation of a 
highly valuable but essentially instable project. To make EU law subject to structural principles is to 
make it and the EU more resilient’.63 
Cremona further distinguishes ‘relational’ structural principles, which ‘govern the 
relationships between actors or legal subjects (not norms)’,64 and ‘systemic’ structural principles, 
which are ‘concerned with the operation of the system as a whole, with building the EU’s identity as 
a coherent, effective and autonomous actor in the world’.65 The autonomy of EU law falls in the latter 
category, alongside coherence and effectiveness; their systemic nature ‘implies that these principles 
serve to guide and shape the other [i.e. relational] structural principles and their implementation’.66 
However, Cremona draws an important distinction between thinking about principles in terms of any 
inherent hierarchy (‘the nature of principles is not to be hierarchic; they accommodate each other and 
a principle may be given more weight in one case than another’) and that understanding not 
‘preclud[ing] the possibility that the Court appears to privilege certain principles over others’.67 This 
insight about constructed more than inherent repercussions perfectly reflects the story of the 
autonomy of EU law, as will now be explained in further detail. However, the extent to which 
                                                     
Autarky?’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/15, <jeanmonnetprogram.org/paper/opinion-213-on-eu-accession-
to-the-echr-and-judicial-dialogue-autonomy-or-autarky/>, visited on 24 May 2018, p.16. 
60 Cremona, supra note 52, p.5.  
61 Ibid p.15.  
62 Ibid p.12 (emphasis in original). 
63 L Azoulai ‘Structural Principles in EU Law: Internal and External’ in Cremona (ed.), supra note 48, p.33 
(emphasis added).  
64 Cremona, supra note 52, p.17 (e.g. sincere cooperation, transparency, institutional balance, conferral). 
65 Ibid p. 18. See similarly, M Klamert, ‘The Autonomy of the EU (and of EU Law): Through the Kaleidoscope’, 
42:6 European Law Review (2017) p.817, who describes autonomy as ‘a systemic or constitutional principle 
derived from the fundamental objectives of the EU legal system’. 
66 Cremona, supra note 52, p. 28. 
67 Ibid p. 14. 
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autonomy is privileged is also argued to distinguish it from other structural principles such as 
coherence and effectiveness. 
   
3.2 An ‘Existential’ Principle of Union Law 
Building further on the idea of autonomy as a systemic structural principle of Union law, in the sense 
that it contributes to the very creation of the EU legal order and not just to its functioning, it is argued 
here that autonomy also evidences a distinctive – and distinctively intense – quality of existentialism. 
Two interconnected reasons explain this claim: first, more briefly, the extent and consequences of its 
felt impact in both the internal and external spheres of the EU legal order; and, second, the 
constructed (rather than inherent) extent of extremism that the application of autonomy entails. 
 On the internal/external dimension, some principles of Union law have internal effect only or 
at least an external effect that is significantly more limited than the effect felt internally (e.g. primacy; 
direct effect). Others, such as the principle of sincere cooperation, have implications in both the 
internal and external spheres, evidencing a symbiotic link between the two domains.68 There can also 
be a more competitively pragmatic dynamic between the internal and external spheres of EU law in 
pursuit of the overarching goal of autonomy: for example, de Witte discusses how recourse to external 
(especially ECHR) fundamental rights standards was a price paid by the Court of Justice to defend the 
autonomy of EU law against national fundamental rights standards.69 In both senses, ‘the substance 
of the autonomous EU legal order takes more concrete form precisely when it collides with national 
and/or international law’.70 Thus, whether in synergy or opposition, the internal and the external are 
inextricably linked, recalling the paradox of autonomy with interdependency observed in Section 2.  
However, the extent of the manifestation of the EU legal order that connects to the invocation 
of autonomy, in both the internal and external spheres of EU law, is arguably unparalleled. As 
principles tied to creating the identity of the EU as an actor, all of the structural principles of Union 
law can be said to have an existential dimension. But for autonomy, the language of the Court is 
strikingly non-negotiable – e.g. ‘[p]reservation of the autonomy of the [Union] legal order 
requires…that the essential character of the powers of the [Union] and its institutions as conceived in 
the Treaty remain unaltered’.71 This quality of extremity sets autonomy apart from other structural 
principles. That is how the idea of autonomy as an existential principle is used here. Examples of 
                                                     
68 For example, this aspect of Opinion 1/76 (supra note 34) is discussed further by Contartese, supra note 9, 
p.1631. Cremona, supra note 52, distinguishes between internal and external effects of structural principles in 
some respects (pp.16-17); this point is returned to below. 
69 B de Witte, [reference to follow]; and e.g. Case 4/73 Nold v Commission, EU:C:1974:51. 
70‘Editorial comments – Polar Exploration: Brexit and the Emerging Frontiers of EU Law’, 55:1 Common Market 
Law Review (2018), p4. 
71 Opinion 1/00, supra note 22, para. 12 (emphasis added). 
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extremity were noted briefly in Section 2 but will now be examined in more detail under three main 
themes: inevitability; non-derogability; and institutional concentration.  
  
 3.2.1 Inevitability 
A strong theme of criticism of the conception of autonomy progressed by the Court is that the 
fundamentals of autonomy as self-rule neither inevitably nor inherently call for the extremity of ‘self-
ness’ with which the autonomy of the EU legal order has come to be defined. A self-standing legal 
order does not have to exclude the influence of external sources or standards or (voluntary) 
submission to external institutions to the extent that the autonomy of EU law has been shaped to 
demand. In other words, this degree of extremity is a Court of Justice choice. Its singular commitment 
to autonomy morphed from securing self-rule to entrenching self-reference, a path that falls more 
steeply from ‘separate from’ to systemic isolation.  
Fundamental rights protection provides a good example of the extremity of autonomy 
through paradox. In its substantive reasoning, the Court draws openly from the common 
constitutional traditions of the Member States to generate EU standards of protection,72 yet it 
precludes (sometimes even in the very same judgments) ‘recourse to the legal rules or concepts of 
national law’ when affirming the autonomy of the EU legal system.73 Opinion 2/13 exemplifies the 
latter, suggesting an ‘absolute and maximalist vision of the impenetrability of EU and international 
law’.74 The Kadi dilution of influences from the international legal order provides another example.75 
How is it that the Court can seem simultaneously to engage with yet also exclude external systems? 
Its concern for autonomy explains the contradiction. National constitutions make decisions about how 
a state can interact with systems that are both internal (e.g. devolution; federalism) and external to 
it. National constitutional or supreme courts then patrol the boundaries of systemic interaction. This 
can be compared to the task of the Court of Justice. However, national standards of rights protection 
tend to be evaluated in a substantive sense against the ‘floor’ established by international norms (as 
articulated by international courts), evidencing an (openness to the) interaction of systems in the 
practice of self-rule that is different from Kadi – there, establishing the priority of EU standards above 
international standards in a more formalistic way seemed decisive.76 This does not mean that external 
standards will ‘win’ but it does shift outwards the terms of the assessment. The closedness of the 
                                                     
72 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, EU:C:1970:114, para. 4. 
73 Ibid para. 3 (emphasis added). 
74 N Jääskinen and A Sikora, ‘The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the 
Unity of the EU Legal Order’ in M Cremona, A Thies, RA Wessel (eds.), The European Union and International 
Dispute Settlement (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2017), p.106. 
75 E.g. G de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi’, 51:1 Harvard 
International Law Journal (2010), pp. 1-49. 
76 See esp. Kadi, supra note 4, paras 306-308. 
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Court of Justice to external influences when the dispute is linked to autonomy contrasts markedly with 
the significance accorded to international law in the case law more generally,77 underlining the 
disconnect between autonomy as a principle concerned with capacity for and operation of self-rule, 
on the one hand, and the inevitability of diminished interaction with other systems, on the other.  
Similarly, the Court of Justice engages regularly with ECtHR case law. But when the context is 
broadened to contemplation of systemic autonomy, the drawbridge that links the two systems is 
retracted. While there are certainly questions about the effectiveness of the ECHR system in practice, 
it is at least a given that, in principle, a national standard found to contravene the Convention cannot 
persist – and the Convention, not national, standard is at the centre of that assessment. Crucially, the 
resulting imprint of the external system on the national standard – even at national constitutional 
level – is not then conflated with the demise of the national system. Opinion 2/94 was the Court’s first 
consideration of accession to the ECHR. Its reasoning focused on the need for Treaty change, but the 
submissions had discussed the implications of accession for autonomy in light of the then recent 
Opinions on the EEA Agreement. Both the Commission and the European Parliament argued that 
accession to the ECHR was not incompatible with the autonomy of the EU legal order, with the 
Parliament’s submission observing that ‘[e]xternal control in the field of human rights does not affect 
the autonomy of the [Union] legal order any more than it prejudices that of the Member States’.78 
Belgium, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy and Sweden argued along similar lines. 
But the Council as well as France, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and the UK did, in contrast, envisage an 
incompatibility between accession and autonomy because of the Court of Justice’s ‘monopoly of 
jurisdiction’.79 By the time of Opinion 2/13, the Court’s agreement-nullifying perspective on accession 
and autonomy stood in complete isolation from all 24 Member State submissions, as well as those of 
the Commission, Council and European Parliament, and the view of AG Kokott.80 For the Court, 
nothing was more important than the autonomy of EU law; for all other EU actors, submitting to 
external scrutiny for the purposes of enriching fundamental rights protection was, in fact, more 
important.  
                                                     
77 E.g. Case C-104/16 P Council v Front Polisario, EU:2016:973; Case C-266/16 Western Sahara Campaign UK, 
EU:C:2018:118. 
78 Opinion 2/94, EU:C:1996:140, [1996] ECR I-1763, p.1777; see similarly, the submission of the Commission: 
‘The Convention imposes only minimum standards. The control machinery has no direct effect in the 
Community legal order. Since it has not been considered contrary to the constitutional principles of the 
Member States, that machinery could hardly be considered to be incompatible with the principles of 
Community law’ (ibid). 
79 Ibid p. 1769. 
80 View of AG Kokott in Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2475. 
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By choosing extremity, the Court reduces the responsibility of the Union in the sense of being 
accountable to the outside;81 it fails to convey an institutional maturity that can comfortably 
accommodate and project the virtue of constitutional humility; and it eschews an approach to 
systemic interaction based more on pragmatic flexibility.82 In contrast, reflecting the reality of 
interconnectedness, in legal as well as other senses, and echoing the vast majority of related 
commentary, Advocate General Jääskinen has called for a more ‘prudent attitude [to] be adopted’ 
since ‘it increasingly often appears difficult for the Court to guarantee observance of the international 
obligations incumbent on the European Union whilst also preserving the autonomy of EU law’.83 
Otherwise, the critical balance identified by Contartese – i.e. balancing ‘the principle that EU 
international agreements must comply with the EU treaties (Art. 218(11) TFEU) with the fact that the 
Union enters into agreements which require changes to EU law (Art. 216(2) TFEU)’84 – is out of kilter; 
successfully realizing the ‘in principle’ prospect provided for in Opinions 1/91 and 1/92 becomes 
elusive. The constraints developed around the capacity for and legitimacy of interaction end up, in 
real terms, defeating the possibility of interaction in the first place.85 A counterpoint to the inevitability 
of extremity was recognised in the Belgian Government’s submission in Opinion 2/94, in the argument 
that the autonomy of the EU legal order was already ‘relative’ because of the practice of the Court of 
Justice in taking ECtHR judgments into account.86 Relative autonomy, in various conceptions, is also 
widely advocated in the academic literature.87 In particular, the idea of relativity is used to describe 
                                                     
81 On the theme of responsibility as accountability in international law, see the contribution to this volume by J 
Klabbers [reference to follow]. On the specific point that the Court of Justice ‘has not digested the idea of 
external control, and sees it as a threat rather than an opportunity’, see Eeckhout, supra note 59, p.39. 
82 Contrasting the more pragmatic approach of AG Wathelet in Achmea, EU:C:2017:699, with the judgment of 
the Court, see the contribution to this volume by P Koutrakos [reference to follow]. 
83 AG Jääskinen in Joined Cases C‑ 401/12 P to C‑ 403/12 P Council v Vereniging Milieudefensie and Stichting 
Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht, EU:C:2014:310, paras 36 and 71 of the Opinion, using the example of 
environmental law as ‘an area in which the law is being drawn up and applied in an increasing number of 
locations, which necessarily entails instances of the interaction, internationalisation and even globalisation of 
that law. This multi-layered legal context requires, in my view, the adoption of a nuanced approach’ (para. 71 
of the Opinion).  
84 Contartese, supra note 9, p.1636. 
85 Contartese qualifies the outcome in Opinion 1/00 in this respect; it remains ‘as yet the only case amongst 
those on the external dimension of autonomy where a draft agreement was declared compatible with the EU 
Treaties without modifications being necessary’ but also, the contested agreement remains ‘the only 
agreement amongst those assessed within the ECJ’s Opinions that does not foresee the establishment of an 
international court or tribunal or accession to one’ since dispute resolution was to be managed via a Joint 
Committee (ibid pp.1636-1637). 
86 Opinion 2/94, supra note 79, p.1778; in its view, what it called ‘absolute autonomy of the [Union] legal order 
in the field of the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Convention is not desirable’. 
87 E.g. challenging conceptions of ‘absolute’ autonomy, J Odermatt, ‘The Principle of Autonomy: An Adolescent 
Disease of EU External Relations Law?’ in Cremona (ed.) supra note 48, pp.291-316; distinguishing between 
‘discursive’ and ‘exclusive’ autonomy, B Pirker and S Reitemeyer, ‘Between Discursive and Exclusive autonomy 
– Opinion 2/13, the Protection of Fundamental Rights and the Autonomy of EU Law’, 17 Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies (2015) pp.168-188. 
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how autonomous systems, including national systems, voluntarily submit to ‘outside’ systems – not 
least, ironically enough, through the act of EU membership itself.  
It should be noted that, in Achmea, the submissions of the Commission as well as several of 
the Member States did come closer to the understanding of autonomy applied by the Court, premised 
in particular on the perceived systemic risks that bilateral investment treaties between Member States 
pose to the underpinning principle of mutual trust. These more mixed perspectives on the reach of 
autonomy when compared to the unanimous submissions received for Opinion 2/13 does suggest a 
particular concern among EU actors, broadly understood, for enhanced protection of fundamental 
rights. For present purposes, however, whether the extremity of autonomy applied by the Court both 
within and outwith the context of fundamental rights is agreed with or not agreed with is one thing; 
that such extremity is produced in reality but is not inevitable is the central point.  The character of 
autonomy as an existential principle of EU law lies more in its construction by the Court than any 
inherent requirements of establishing or sustaining a capacity for self-rule. Azoulai’s reminder of the 
comparative contestability of the EU system is, however, worth recalling in terms of trying to 
understand why things developed as they have.  
 
 3.2.1 Non-derogability 
The second vector of existential extremity is captured by Dougan’s reference to autonomy ‘act[ing] as 
non-derogable constitutional limits to the exercise of EU external competences, designed to insulate 
the internal functioning of the Union’s institutional and legal system from any degree of external 
interference or influence’.88 In this sense, the conditions necessary to shield the autonomy of EU law 
from incursion are described by the Court as ‘indispensable’.89 Hardly any rule or principle of EU law 
is non-derogable, which makes autonomy stand out with respect to the extent to which this has been 
achieved in practice. Contartese observes that it ‘should be possible to clearly distinguish between 
what is “essential”, from which no derogations are allowed, and what is not, and therefore open to 
external influences’; similarly, she argues that ‘a further aspect of autonomy to be identified should 
lie in its limits’ but also that ‘[i]t is in the (current) impossibility to detect its limits that the ECJ’s case 
law reveals its ambiguity’.90 This ‘ambiguity’ around the limits of autonomy reflects precisely, it is 
                                                     
88 Dougan, supra note 49, p.87 (emphasis added). Again, the ‘insulation’ produced when autonomy is brought 
into the discussion should be distinguished from the interaction of the systems of EU, national and 
international law more generally. 
89 Opinion 2/13, supra note 6, para. 183. 
90 Contartese, supra note 9, p.1671. 
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suggested here, the non-derogable character of the principle compared to other principles, including 
other structural principles, of Union law.91  
More specifically, because the very existence of the Union is deemed to be vulnerable when 
autonomy is mobilized, compromise is neither logical nor viable. Linking back to the ‘adverse effect’ 
standard of breach outlined in Section 2, Krenn is deeply critical of how ‘overly protective’ the Court 
is in the face of what could be conceived as ‘minor and immaterial threats’.92 However, in a context 
of existentialism, all threats are collapsed together in terms of potential risk. This point can be 
illustrated by the failure of autonomy to surface in a less extreme way across more areas of EU law. 
For example, in Rottmann, AG Poiares Maduro suggested that EU citizenship, since it ‘forms the basis 
of a new political area from which rights and duties emerge, which are laid down by [Union] law and 
do not depend on the State…in turn, legitimises the autonomy and authority of the [Union] legal 
order’.93 But this idea was never really picked up in subsequent case law. On the contrary, the 
decisions built upon Rottmann, which draw rights directly from Article 20 TFEU where no cross-border 
element characterises the facts of the case, proceeds on the more exceptional basis that only the loss 
of EU citizenship altogether or forced departure from the territory of the Union as a whole will suffice 
to trigger supranational protection – certainly not ‘minor and immaterial threats’.94 However, the 
sustainability of the non-derogability of autonomy and the constraints placed on the EU’s capacity for 
compromise as a result are returned to in Section 4 below in the context of Brexit.  
 
 3.2.3 Institutional Concentration 
The extent of institutional concentration on protecting the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice – noting, 
conversely, the range of external dispute settlement mechanisms that autonomy almost always then 
defeats – is a strong exemplar of extremity, leading to depictions of the ‘selfishness’95 or ‘fearfulness’96 
of the Court. The criticism is that the Court has fixated on even perceived risks to its own authority 
notwithstanding the consequences of its constructed version of autonomy for the capacity of other 
EU actors to commit to external mechanisms, constraining in turn their capacity to interact 
                                                     
91 The non-derogability of the primacy of EU law, theoretically at least, should be noted here; but primacy is 
distinguished from autonomy in other respects below.  
92 C Krenn, ‘Autonomy and Effectiveness as Common Concerns: A Path to ECHR Accession after Opinion 2/13’, 
16:1 German Law Journal (2015) pp.147-148. 
93 AG Poaires Maduro in Case C-135/08 Rottmann, EU:C:2009:508, para. 23 of the Opinion. 
94 E.g. Case C-40/11 Iida, EU:C:2012:691, esp. para. 71. 
95 B de Witte, ‘A Selfish Court? The Court of Justice and the Design of International Dispute Settlement beyond 
the European Union’ in M Cremona and A Thies (eds.), The European Court of Justice and External Relations 
Law: Constitutional Challenges (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2014) pp.33-46. See also, D Kochenov, ‘EU Law 
without the Rule of Law: Is the Veneration of Autonomy Worth It?’, 34:1 Yearbook of European Law (2015) 
pp.74-96. 
96 E Spaventa, ‘A Very Fearful Court? The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU after Opinion 2/13’, 22:1 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2015) pp.35-56.  
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meaningfully with the wider world. For example, Eckes remarks that ‘[u]ltimately, the different 
purposes of external autonomy melt into the main objective: to protect the monopolist position of 
the [Court] as the  final arbiter not only of the relation between EU law and international law, but also 
of all relations within the EU legal order’.97 Some leeway is extended to the Court in light of the 
foreseeability of the autonomy case law, including Opinion 2/13, because of the consistency of the 
narrative from Van Gen den Loos and Costa v ENEL onwards.98 But foreseeability is not the same thing 
as inevitability, as discussed above. Emphasizing instead the purposive dimension, autonomy as 
service rather than selfishness is pointed to by Odermatt, observing that ‘the Court’s protection of its 
judicial monopoly is a means by which to preserve…autonomy, and is not only motivated by a need to 
preserve its own prerogatives and powers’.99 As seen in Section 2, the Court has sought also to protect 
the the functions of national courts within the composite EU judicial system.100 Contartese is therefore 
right to caution that ‘it would be reductive to narrow down the case law on autonomy to a sort of 
fortress behind which the ECJ defends itself from all other international jurisdictions’.101  
Nevertheless, there is the sticky sense that all roads on questions of both jurisdiction and 
substance lead back to the Court of Justice anyway, cushioned by Article 19(1) TEU. Thus, while the 
Court characterized autonomy in terms of protecting against adverse effects on the allocation of 
responsibilities defined in the Treaties in Opinion 1/91, it did then emphasise its own competence 
both to articulate and to assure respect for that definition. The power to control external interaction 
is therefore highly concentrated on the Court – to date at least, as returned to in Section 4 below. 
 
 3.2.4 Existentialism beyond Autonomy? 
The three coordinates of extremity outlined above – inevitability; non-derogability; and institutional 
coordination – collectively construct the idea of autonomy as an existential principle of EU law. In line 
with Cremona’s expected attributes of a structural principle of Union law, autonomy subdues both 
                                                     
97 C Eckes, ‘International Rulings and the EU Legal Order: Autonomy as Legitimacy?’ CLEER Papers 2016/2, 
<www.asser.nl/media/3002/cleer16-2_complete_web.pdf>, visited on 24 May 2018, p.12. 
98 D Halberstam, ‘”It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!” A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights’, 16:1 German Law Journal (2015) pp.105-146. See similarly, J 
Odermatt, ‘When a Fence Becomes a Cage: The Principle of Autonomy in EU External Relations Law’ (2016/07) 
EUI MWP, <cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/41046/MWP_2016_07.pdf?sequence=1>, visited on 24 
May 2018, p.16. On the potential for a problematic ripple effect of an alternative outcome in Opinion 2/13, 
opening up space for national courts also to assert their claims about the nature and source of authority of EU 
law and in turn ‘undermin[ing] the monopoly of legal interpretation of the [Court of Justice] over EU law’, see 
Eckes, supra note 97, pp.19-21 and 30. 
99 J Odermatt, supra note 98, p.5. See further, p.10. 
100 See again, Opinion 1/09, supra note 5, and Achmea, supra note 3.  
101 Contartese, supra note 9, p.1669, continuing that ‘[a]utonomy has, in fact, been applied to protect the 
powers of the other [Union] institutions (Opinion 1/76), the relationship amongst EU Member States (Opinion 
1/76 and Opinion 2/13), the respect for the division of competence between the EU and its Member States 
(Opinion 1/91 and Opinion 2/13), and the role of the EU Member States’ national courts (Opinion 1/09)’. 
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the substantive and the purposive by prioritizing the edifice of the EU legal order on its own, more 
abstract terms. But autonomy is employed at a level of extremity not readily shared by principles of 
Union law more generally. Autonomy is animated not by ‘puzzle to be worked out’ but by ‘threat’ as 
well as by perception of threat. It is, in effect, non-negotiable: a non-derogable legal red line. It 
equates reductions in the self-referential character of the EU legal system not just with a kind of 
subjugation – even through choice and/or for very good reason – but with existential wipeout.  
Brexit probes qualities in a particularly acute way at present: it makes the existential threat 
feel distinctly real, for one thing; and, in consequence, we see a shift away from institutional 
concentration on the jurisdiction of the Court and a dilution of the tinge of desperation that such 
concentration has sometimes emitted. Brexit brings the scale of the threat into sharper relief, making 
it feel more genuinely existential. At the time of writing, the deeply frustrating state of negotiations 
reveals the difference in reality between political red lines, largely on the UK side, and legal red lines, 
which shape EU positions.102 These points are developed in Section 4 below. But first, a final question 
about existential principles of Union law: do others exist beyond autonomy?  
As suggested earlier, principles such as institutional balance, coherence or transparency lack 
the qualities of extremity discussed here, especially with respect to non-derogability. More 
specifically, it seems unlikely that the Court would ‘go to the wire’ in their protection. My intuition is 
that only the principle of unity of the EU legal order comes closest to the existential principle 
threshold. It shares two important features with autonomy. First, the unity of the EU legal order has 
had both internal and external effects. In that respect, there is also the suggestion of both the 
symbiotic and competitive qualities discussed above for autonomy.103 As mentioned in Section 3.1, 
and in fact using unity as the example, Cremona distinguishes how structural principles acquire shape 
in their internal and external contexts. She suggests that ‘[s]tructural principles in the internal context 
may be concerned primarily with the structure that it is the Union’s mission to build’ (e.g. ‘unity of the 
market’ or of the ‘internal space within which freedom of movement may take place’) while unity in 
the external context ‘, in contrast, ‘insofar as the EU has a mission to construct…is to construct the EU 
itself as an effective external actor. Thus, for example, unity becomes a question of the unity of the 
international representation of the Union and its Member States’.104 But perhaps the distinction is not 
significant for present purposes, considering that the external context concern ‘with the articulation 
                                                     
102 Equating rather than distinguishing the two, e.g. European Union Committee, ‘UK-EU relations after Brexit’, 
17th Report of Session 2017–19, 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/149/149.pdf>, visited on 26 June 2018. 
103 For a different view, merging ‘concern for the unity of the EU legal order’ with ‘the basic rationale behind 
the concept of autonomy’, see JW van Rossem, ‘The Autonomy of EU Law: More is Less?’ in RA Wessel and S 
Blockmans (eds.), Between Autonomy and Dependence: The EU Legal Order under the Influence of 
International Organisations (TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2013) p.19. 
104 Cremona, supra note 52, pp.16-17.  
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of power of the EU’s constituent parts (including the Member States…)’105 also resonates with the role 
of the Court in the internal domain, especially thinking back to the annunciation of direct effect in the 
context of the effectiveness of the EU customs union. In any case, for present purposes, it is the very 
fact that concrete boundaries around the EU’s capacity to act both internally and externally are 
induced by the principle of unity – in distinction from primacy and direct effect, the principles typically 
associated with the ‘essential characteristics’ of Union law alongside autonomy. Primacy does have a 
more non-derogable edge than direct effect, but it concerns effects conferred after EU action is taken 
in the form of a conflict of laws rule. 
Second, sharing the purposive origin of autonomy outlined in Section 2, impairment of the 
‘unity and efficacy’ of EU law has been described by the Court as a rule that is ‘fundamental to the 
existence of the [Union]’.106 However, while the principles that tend to be cited most frequently 
alongside the unity of EU law – coherence and effectiveness – are profoundly important to the optimal 
functioning of the Union, incoherent or ineffective EU law does not tend to have existential 
implications. For example, harmonized corporate taxation might induce a more coherent and effective 
internal market, but its absence does not negate the internal market. Coherence and effectiveness 
are outcome-oriented principles that are situation-variable, or at least situation-dependent. They 
achieve something within the Union. In contrast, the principles of autonomy and unity are (also) 
invoked to constitute it – to make it (continue to) exist. 
There are critical questions that need to be unpacked further in trying to understand the 
nature of unity more deeply; for example, about the extent of overlap (or otherwise) between unity 
and the uniformity of EU law.107 However, a hesitation in characterizing unity as an existential principle 
stems from the pragmatism that the Court has shown in accepting less rigid and therefore less 
extreme manifestations of the unity of the EU legal order – most strikingly in connection with extra-
Treaty solutions developed in the context of the Eurozone crisis.108 At a general level, the extent to 
which differentiated integration represents disintegration is an important theme in current thinking 
                                                     
105 Ibid p.17. 
106 Commission v Belgium, supra note 7, para. 19 (emphasis added. 
107 E.g. consider the English (‘to ensure that the specific characteristics and the autonomy of the EU legal order 
are preserved, the Treaties have established a judicial system intended to ensure consistency and uniformity in 
the interpretation of EU law’) and French (‘la cohérence et l’unité’) versions of Achmea, supra note 3, para. 35 
(emphasis added). The expression is translated into English (also from French) as ‘coherence and unity’ in the 
Opinion of AG Wathelet, supra note 82, para. 234 of the Opinion. See generally, Jääskinen and Sikora, supra 
note 74, pp.101-112. 
108 See esp. Case C-370/12 Pringle, EU:C:2012:756. See e.g. Azoulai, supra note 63, p.39: ‘[w]hat is particularly 
striking is the ease with which the Court accepts the use of the EU institutions in a context which is profoundly 
adverse to the development of the legal and institutional culture of the EU’. See further, B de Witte and T 
Beukers, ‘The Court of Justice Approves the Creation of the European Stability Mechanism outside the EU 
Legal Order: Pringle’, 50:3 Common Market Law Review (2013) pp.845-846. 
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about the capacity of the Union legal order to tolerate and make provision for difference.109 However, 
if the balance between integration and difference achieved to date is perceived to veer in the wrong 
direction, the Court’s recourse to the unity of the EU legal order could ignite more definitively – more 
extremely – than we have yet seen. Azoulai perfectly expresses the central dilemma – ‘whether the 
Court will be able to solve the conundrum of providing for the unity of a non-unitary polity’ – and this 
is a question that is going to grow sharper edges.110 Unity may, then, be thought of as an existential 
principle in waiting. But the converse conclusion for now is that autonomy does not, yet, share the 
existential principle stage.  
 
4. Brexit and the Generalization of Autonomy  
Almost all case law on the autonomy of EU law to date has ultimately concerned the compatibility of 
dispute settlement mechanisms external to the EU legal order with the ‘essential characteristics’ of 
the Union and of EU law, with a related dominant concern for the authority of the Court of Justice 
(both directly and indirectly). However, as seen in Section 2, the roots of autonomy were always 
connected to a more general perspective – ‘the allocation of responsibilities defined in the Treaties 
and, hence, the autonomy of the [Union] legal order’111 – as engaged with in Opinion 1/76. The process 
of negotiating Brexit brings back to the forefront this more general institutional dimension through 
the emphasis being placed on autonomy of Union decision-making. Of course, boundaries generated 
by autonomy as it relates to protecting the jurisdiction of the Court will continue to constrain what 
can be agreed to, on the EU part, in the expected Withdrawal Agreement between the EU and the UK 
(including arrangements for transition) and also in the agreement(s) determining the future 
relationship between the EU and the UK.112 However, the Union decision-making aspect of the Brexit 
                                                     
109 See European Commission, White Paper on the Future of Europe – Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 
by 2025, COM(2017) 2025; B de Witte, ‘An Undivided Union? Differentiated Integration in Post-Brexit Times’, 
55:2/3 Common Market Law Review (2018) pp. 227–249; and D Thym, ‘Competing Models for Understanding 
Differentiated Integration” in B de Witte, A Ott and E Vos (eds.), Between Flexibility and Disintegration – The 
Trajectory of Differentiation in EU Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2017) pp.28-75. 
110 L Azoulai ‘The Many Visions of Europe: Insights from the Reasoning of the European Court of Justice in 
External Relations Law’ in Cremona and Thies (eds.), supra note 95, p.182. 
111 Opinion 1/91, supra note 2, para. 29 (emphasis added). 
112 For example, as discussed by Eckes in a general rather than Brexit-specific sense, dispute settlement that 
relates to complaints received by individuals, and not just states, has specific Brexit relevance, not least in 
connection with the citizens’ rights part of the expected Withdrawal Agreement (Eckes, supra note 97, p.15). 
See, at the time of writing, European Commission, Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community – 
TF50 (2018) 35 – Commission to EU27, 19 March 2018, <ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/draft_agreement_coloured.pdf>, visited on 24 May 2018. Note, for example, the proposal for 
time limited access to the preliminary rulings procedure under Article 151 of the Draft Agreement. See further, 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Council (Article 50) on the state 
of progress of the negotiations with the United Kingdom under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, 
COM(2017) 784 final, 8 December 2017, pp.14-15. 
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negotiation framework generates a seam of autonomy impact beyond the Court and evidences, for 
really the first time, more conscious engagement by the political institutions with the process of 
reflecting on and articulating the essential characteristics of the Union and of its legal order.113 
It is interesting that what became the principle of indivisibility of the single market was already 
evident (‘acceptance of all four freedoms’) in the statement issued on 29 June 2016 by the EU27 as 
well as the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, in the immediate 
aftermath of the referendum result in the UK.114 But in terms of what the Union ‘is’, there was more 
a sense of uncertainty.115 However, one year later, confidence was restored. In its April 2017 Article 
50 Guidelines, the European Council articulated the ‘Core Principles’ that ‘define the framework for 
negotiations under Article 50 TEU’; and it included there, and from the outset, the commitment that 
‘[t]he Union will preserve its autonomy as regards its decision-making as well as the role of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union’.116  
The Council Decision agreeing Directives for the negotiation of a withdrawal agreement  
adopted the dual autonomy conception envisaged by the European Council: that it requires protection 
of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice with respect to ‘effective enforcement and dispute 
settlement mechanisms’; but that is also requires protection of the Union’s ‘institutional structure’ 
more broadly.117 This generalization is captured in the much-repeated expression that autonomy of 
                                                     
113 Cf. the more efficiency-driven understanding of the autonomy of Union decision-making in an address given 
by Commissioner de Clercq at the EEC/EFTA ministerial meeting at Interlaken on 20 May 1987, 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-87-32_en.htm>, visited on 26 June 2018, p6. I am grateful to 
Marise Cremona for this reference.   
114 Informal meeting at 27 Brussels, 29 June 2016 Statement, 
<www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20462/sn00060-en16.pdf>, visited on 24 May 2018, para. 4. 
115 ‘The European Union is a historic achievement of peace, prosperity and security on the European continent 
and remains our common framework. At the same time many people express dissatisfaction with the current 
state of affairs, be it at the European or national level. Europeans expect us to do better when it comes to 
providing security, jobs and growth, as well as hope for a better future. We need to deliver on this, in a way 
that unites us, not least in the interest of the young.  This is why we are starting today a political reflection to 
give an impulse to further reforms, in line with our Strategic Agenda, and to the development of the EU with 
27 Member States’ (ibid, paras 6-7). 
116 European Council (Article 50) guidelines on Brexit negotiations, 29 April 2017, 
<www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/29/euco-brexit-guidelines/>, visited on 24 May 
2018, para. 1 (emphasis added). The European Parliament had already referenced both the ‘decision-making 
capacity and autonomy of the Union’ (para. 22) and the role of the Court of Justice (para. 28) earlier in the 
same month; see European Parliament resolution of 5 April 2017 on negotiations with the United Kingdom 
following its notification that it intends to withdraw from the European Union (2017/2593(RSP)), 5 April 2017, 
< www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-
0102+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>, visited on 24 May 2018. 
117 Council, Directives for the negotiation of an agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the European Union, XT 21016/17, 22 
May 2017, <www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21766/directives-for-the-negotiation-xt21016-
ad01re02en17.pdf>, visited on 24 May 2018, paras 17 and 39. 
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the Union and of its legal order includes the role of the Court of Justice.118 The structural nature of 
autonomy, from the perspective of the political institutions, is further evidenced by the fact that 
autonomy tended not to be referenced in more detailed/substantive Brexit papers119 but was instead 
used, repeatedly, to frame and underpin more overarching negotiation mandates. However, as 
negotiations progress, legal constraints fixed by the autonomy of Union decision-making are now 
referenced more often in substantive papers too.120 That makes sense in the context of the more 
urgent need to think about ensuring the effectiveness of what will be agreed to in the expected 
Withdrawal Agreement, in the first instance, through mechanisms to monitor compliance of the 
commitments entered into (and not just to settle disputes where things go awry in future practice).  
However, the most striking manifestation of the autonomy of Union decision-making at the 
time of writing concerns the stark statements codified in the Draft Withdrawal Agreement published 
in March 2018. Following indications communicated by the European Parliament,121 the 
Commission122, and the Council,123 Article 6(1) of the Draft Agreement provides:  
 
For the purposes of this Agreement, all references to Member States and competent 
authorities of Member States in provisions of Union law made applicable by this Agreement 
shall be read as including the United Kingdom and its competent authorities, except as 
regards: 
                                                     
118 E.g. European Commission, Task Force for the Preparation and Conduct of the Negotiations with the United 
Kingdom under Article 50 TEU, Position paper transmitted to EU27 on Governance, TF50 (2017) 4 – 
Commission to EU 27, 28 June 2017, <ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/essential_principles_governance_0.pdf>, visited on 24 May 2018. See further, slides dated 19 
January 2018 on ‘Governance’, <ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/governance.pdf>, visited 
on 24 May 2018; European Commission, supra note XX [regulatory]; and European Parliament resolution of 14 
March 2018 on the framework of the future EU- UK relationship (2018/2573(RSP)), 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2018-
0069+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>, visited on 24 May 2018, esp. paras 4, 14, 39, and 41-42. 
119 E.g. it was not referenced in any of the ‘Joint Technical Notes’ that outline the progress of negotiations on 
citizens’ rights. 
120 E.g. European Commission, Task Force for the Preparation and Conduct of the Negotiations with the United 
Kingdom under Article 50 TEU, slides on 29 January 2018 on “police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters’, <ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/police_judicial_cooperation_in_criminal_matters_0.pdf>, visited on 24 May 2018. 
121 European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2017 on the state of play of negotiations with the United 
Kingdom (2017/2964(RSP)), 13 December 2017, <www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2017-0490+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN>, visited on 24 May 2018, para. 12. 
122 European Commission, Annex to the Recommendation for a Council Decision supplementing the Council 
Decision of 22 May 2017 authorising the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland for an agreement setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the European Union, 
COM(2017) 830 final, para. 17. 
123 Council, Annex to the Council Decision supplementing the Council Decision of 22 May 2017 authorising the 
opening of the negotiations with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for an agreement 
setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the European Union – Supplementary directives for the 
negotiation of an agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland setting out the 
arrangements for its withdrawal from the European Union, 29 January 2018, 
<www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32507/xt21004en18.pdf>, visited on 24 May 2018, para. 18. 
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(a) the nomination, appointment or election of members of the institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies of the Union, as well as the participation in the decision-making and the 
attendance in the meetings of the institutions; 
(b) the participation in the decision-making and governance of the bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union; 
(c) the attendance in the meetings of the committees referred to in Article 3(2) of Regulation 
(EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council4, of Commission expert 
groups or of other similar entities, or in the meetings of expert groups or similar entities of 
bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement. 
 
The extent of the exclusion of the UK from Union decision-making that Article 6(1) seeks to achieve 
contrasts strongly with the effects that such decision-making will continue to have after the UK’s 
withdrawal from the Union, since Article 126 of the Draft Agreement confirms that ‘[d]uring the 
transition period, the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union shall have the powers 
conferred upon them by Union law in relation to the United Kingdom and natural and legal persons 
residing or established in the United Kingdom’ and that ‘[i]n particular, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union shall have jurisdiction as provided for in the Treaties’. There is a sense of extremity 
here not reflected in the decision-forming participation extended under, for example, the EEA 
framework. The expectation that decisions made by the Union autonomously will apply to the UK as 
a non-member state is a complex constitutional twist; when read together with the hard lines 
expressed in Article 6(1) of the Draft Agreement, it raises questions about the extent to which the 
fundamentals of EU law – and the legal basis of Article 50 TEU more specifically124 – can comfortably 
accommodate the ‘specialness’ of the Union being extended externally to this extent.125  
However, from the perspective of trying to understand what autonomy ‘is’, the implications 
of the autonomy of Union decision-making that constrains what the EU can concede in Brexit 
negotiations confirm precisely, even archetypically, the existential quality of the principle suggested 
in this article: for if being out of the Union was just like being in it, not least from an institutional 
perspective, what would be the point of the Union’s existence at all? The degree to which the UK is 
envisaged as being excluded from Union decision-making reflects an extreme choice. Here too, in 
synchronicity with the autonomy of EU law developed so far in the case law, the uniqueness of the 
bond that is considered to result from the mutual trust shared by EU Member States prevails. But 
through the Brexit process, the political institutions evolve beyond passive responders to the Court’s 
conception of autonomy and become active in deciding both what the ‘essential characteristics’ of the 
Union and of EU law actually are, and how far those characteristics should legally constrain political 
                                                     
124 On these questions in the context of transition but with wider implications, see Dougan, supra note 49, 
pp.91-95 
125 For different perspectives on some of these questions, cf. Hillion, supra note 58, and Dougan, supra note 
49. 
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choices that all EU actors might make. Through inevitable challenges to the extremity of its application 
that we are likely to see as negotiations advance, Brexit will, in turn, determine whether autonomy 
remains ‘the’ existential principle of Union law or not. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This article has argued that the autonomy of EU law and of the EU legal order is a very particular, to 
date unique, structural principle of Union law. This characterization is drawn primarily from its 
conception in the case law of the Court of Justice and sits within a broader examination of EU primary 
law and especially the manufacturing process for extra-Treaty primary law. As well as generating 
effects felt in both the internal and external spheres of EU law, autonomy is distinguished from other 
principles by a quality of extremity. It has become ‘the’ existential principle of Union law, 
overshadowing other structural principles that may well have existential dimensions but concern for 
which has not produced a constraining of the capacity of EU actors to interact with other systems to 
anything like the same extent. Opinion 2/13 demonstrates that it is not enough for the Treaty to 
compel an action (accession to the ECHR). While Article 218(11) TFEU provides for the revision of the 
Treaties, it would now seem that the more ‘drastic solution’126 of a Treaty amendment contradicting 
the Opinion of the Court (rather than, after Opinion 2/94, accommodating it) is needed to ensure a 
legally meaningful accession that enables genuine external supervision of EU action and standards. It 
is impossible to imagine how such an action would not realize another Brexit-familiar formula – a 
constitutional crisis – since it would amount to diminution of the consistently reaffirmed ‘essential 
characteristics’ of Union law, which constitute ‘the very foundations’ of the existence of the Union.  
 It was also shown that (re-)animation of the autonomy of Union decision-making as a ‘core 
principle’ framing Article 50 TEU negotiations both generalizes autonomy as a legal principle and 
confirms the essence of its existential character. But Brexit is a political challenge the logistical 
complexity of which makes accession to the ECHR pale in comparative significance. Will the legal 
boundaries fixed by autonomy at this stage of the Brexit process continue to exert the extreme, non-
derogable quality of autonomy developed in the case law of the Court?127 If they do, the existential 
extremity of autonomy is reinforced. But the contestability of the Union then becomes entrenched 
rather than conquered, as do the apparently novel attributes of EU standards above any others.  
                                                     
126 Contartese, supra note 9, p1670. 
127 At the time of writing, that tone does remain evident; see e.g. Michel Barnier’s speech at the XXVIIIth FIDE 
congress, 26th May 2018, <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-18-3962_fr.htm>, visited on 28 May 2018: 
‘Et surtout il serait contraire aux intérêts de nos entreprises d'abandonner notre autonomie de décision. Cette 
autonomie nous permet de poser des normes pour l'ensemble de l'UE mais aussi souvent de voir ces normes 
reprises dans le monde entier…Et nous ne pouvons, nous ne pourrons pas partager cette autonomie 
décisionnelle avec un pays tiers, sans doute un ancien Etat membre mais qui ne veut plus être dans le même 
écosystème juridique que nous’. 
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If they do not, some recalibration of the relative influence of the legal and the political in the 
‘very foundations’ of the Union would take place. This could be softened by attaching legacy legal 
effects to the situation of the UK as a distinctive third state – as a former Member State.128 A positive 
consequence of this approach would be that the search for some sense of compromise, flexibility or 
limits in the make-up of autonomy would produce something tangible. The criticism that autonomy 
was ‘really’ more about the authority of the Court of Justice than the self-rule of the EU legal order 
would end up being confirmed. But a more complex and confident EU legal order, that stands for many 
things, would also be confirmed. Autonomy would remain an important structural principle of EU law 
but not an existential principle with such extreme implications. There is just something a bit 
depressing, though, about Brexit potentially succeeding where enriched protection for fundamental 
rights could not.  
 
 
                                                     
128 Editorial comments, supra note 70, pp.15-16. 
